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THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE: A POTENTIALLY 
PREMATURE WRIT OF SUPERVISORY CONTROL  
 
Caitlin Boland Aarab 
 
No. OP 14-0096 
Montana Supreme Court 
 
State of Montana, Petitioner v. Montana Ninth Judicial District Court, 
Teton County, the Hon. Robert Olson, District Judge, Respondent 
 
Oral Argument: Monday, April 28, 2014, at 10:00 a.m. in the Strand 
Union Building, Ballroom A on the campus of Montana State University, 
Bozeman, Montana 
 
I. JONATHAN M. KRAUSS FOR PETITIONER 
 
Mr. Krauss began his argument by assuring the Court that this 
petition for a Writ of Supervisory Control over the Ninth Judicial District 
Court is not the State’s way of forcing the defendant to testify, in 
contravention of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right. Rather, this 
Writ is about enforcing the rules of evidence that apply to all parties, 
including criminal defendants. Whatever evidence a defendant chooses 
to offer in his defense must be admissible.  
 This opening led to an exchange between Mr. Krauss and Justice 
Wheat. The point of admitting evidence, Justice Wheat noted, is to allow 
opposing counsel to test that evidence by cross examination. In this case, 
the defendant signed a Miranda waiver, voluntarily submitted to 
questioning by the County Attorney and the investigator, and even 
handed over a typed statement summarizing the defendant’s version of 
events. Since that was so, Justice Wheat asked, didn’t the State have the 
opportunity to cross examine the defendant on the statement he gave? 
Mr. Krauss responded in the “past exonerative tense”1: “Well, questions 
were asked.”2 Mr. Krauss then pivoted to policy: the point of the rules of 
evidence is to admit only reliable evidence. The fact that an unsworn 
statement was given voluntarily does not make it reliable. The 
defendant’s statement includes hearsay, double hearsay, triple hearsay, 
and victim character evidence; and the entire statement is offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted. The rules of evidence should not be ignored 
simply because the burden of proof in justifiable use of force cases now 
rests with the State and not the defendant.3 
                                         
1
 John M. Broder, Familiar Fallback for Officials: ‘Mistakes Were Made’, N.Y. Times (Mar. 14, 
2007) (available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/14/washington/ 14mistakes.html). 
2
 01:18:09 
3
 Mont. Code Ann. § 46–16–131 (2013). 
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II. KENNETH R. OLSON FOR RESPONDENT 
 
 Mr. Olson began by assuring the Court that his position is far less 
radical than Petitioner made it out to be. Mr. Olson did not argue that 
criminal defendants should be allowed to rely on inadmissible evidence 
in justifiable use of force cases. Rather, Mr. Olson argued that the 
statement in question is actually admissible for two reasons: (1) the 
statement contains genuine indicia of trustworthiness, and (2) the 
statements are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. First, the 
circumstances under which the statement was made support its 
trustworthiness: the interview was conducted by the County Attorney 
and the investigator, and they had the opportunity to take as long as they 
wanted and ask as many questions as they wanted; the County Attorney 
and the investigator praised the defendant for his honesty in his answers; 
and the 9–1–1 recording, which is admissible, corroborates the 
defendant’s version of events. Second, the statement contains a recitation 
of all the “bad acts” the defendant knew the victim to have committed. 
The evidence of victim “bad acts” didn’t need to be true in order for the 
defendant to have justifiably relied on them when assessing what level of 
force to use against the victim in self-defense. Thus, this evidence is not 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted. 
 In response to Mr. Olson’s first argument, Judge Holly Brown, 
sitting by designation, distinguished the present case from prior case law: 
in Montana case law dealing with hearsay exceptions, “circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness”4 are found in statements made in the heat 
of the moment. In contrast, the statement at issue here was made after the 
defendant had a motivation to lie. Judge Brown then read the text of 
Montana Code Annotated Section 46–16–131 to counsel and the Court 
and lingered on the phrase “when the defendant has offered evidence of 
justifiable use of force.” Her point was to draw attention to the word 
“evidence” in the statutes that came out of House Bill 228. The statute 
may have shifted the burden of proof, but the requirement of admissible 
evidence has not changed. 
In response to Mr. Olson’s second argument, Justice Wheat asked 
the million-dollar question: why is this our problem? Justice Wheat 
asked Mr. Olson if evidence of the victim’s violent behavior could 
possibly be introduced through another witness and not through the 
defendant’s statement. Mr. Olson replied in the affirmative. Well then, 
Justice Wheat suggested, why doesn’t this Court simply deny the Writ 
and send this case back for trial so that a full evidentiary record can be 
developed? After a considerable pause, Mr. Olson agreed that denying 
the Writ and proceeding to trial might render this Writ moot. Then 
                                         
4
 Mont. R. Evid. 803(24). 
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Justice Rice chimed in: “I think you hit it on the head earlier when you 
described the problem we have here without a record explaining what 
happened.”5 Buzzer. Time’s up. 
 
III. PREDICTION 
 
The Justices seemed persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that the 
defendant’s statement is not admissible and thus should not be admitted. 
But toward the end of oral argument, Justice Wheat’s question about the 
advisability of denying the Writ and allowing the case to proceed to trial 
gained traction. This author predicts that the Court will deny the Writ 
even though it is likely to side with Petitioners on the merits of the 
evidentiary issue should this issue come back on appeal following trial. 
 
Lower Court: Teton County Cause No. DC 12-009; Honorable Robert 
Olson, District Court Judge of the Ninth Judicial District, Teton County. 
 
Attorney for Petitioner: Jonathan M. Krauss, Assistant Attorney General, 
State of Montana. 
 
On behalf of Respondent, Attorney for Defendant Martin Vincent Lau: 
Kenneth R. Olson, Olson Law Office, P.C., Great Falls, Montana. 
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